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Army Expansibility

Rapid Expansion and the Army’s
Matériel: Is There Enough?
Robb C. Mitchell
ABSTRACT: This article examines the matériel challenges the US
Army might encounter if it were required to expand to twice its size
on short notice.

F

or the US Army to expand rapidly, its leaders will have to make
critical decisions on organizational and matériel requirements.
However, a recent research effort at the US Army War College
reveals that some equipment, such as air defense artillery and aviation
assets, will be difficult to procure quickly.1 This challenge is due to the
manufacturing requirements of American and allied industries, and
it is significant enough to require the Army to reexamine some of its
expectations about rapid expansion. For instance, 10 years would be
needed to produce theater ballistic defense equipment and ammunition,
eight years for aviation assets such as attack helicopters, and three years
for armored units such as the M2 Bradley fighting vehicles and armored
breaching vehicles.
Admittedly, the Army could use prepositioned stocks to overcome
some of its matériel challenges. Likewise, older equipment from the
depots could be issued, newer equipment from commercial markets
could be purchased, or the Army could adjust the quantities it requires.
But, these solutions will not provide the Army with everything it needs;
nor would they provide it with the most capable equipment for fighting
another great power.

Analytical Framework and Findings

The benchmark for this study was doubling the Army within a
36-month time frame. While any number of scenarios would not require
that level of effort, many would. Regardless, the benchmark helped
identify a number of stress points within the matériel production system
that the Army should address. In addition, the following assumptions
were made. First, financial aspects of production are relaxed. Second,
acquisitions and contracting allow for open competition and sole-source
contracting. Third, maintenance and sustainment are initially conducted
by contractors and later transitioned to Army personnel. Fourth, space
for facilities or training is sufficient. Fifth, American acquisitions are
prioritized by the State Department, which would include stopping
production for foreign military sales and delaying new agreements
during expansion. Sixth, equipment from Army prepositioned stock is
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1      This study was carried out by an integrated team of faculty and students who examined the attending the US Army
War College.
US Army’s ability to expand quickly to fight a great-power war.
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harvested as soon as possible and refilled later. Lastly, outdated equipment
solutions are accepted by the Army until new matériel becomes available.
The study’s principal finding was that American industry would
struggle to build and to field enough theater ballistic defense, aviation,
mechanized infantry, and other matériel to meet the benchmark
described above. Therefore, to acquire the raw materials needed to
produce Army equipment during an expansion effort, the Department
of Defense should develop and publish a plan similar to the Industrial
Mobilization Plan of 1939.2 The pre-World War II mobilization plan that
synchronized production schedules of different equipment, for example,
was published by the Army in early 1938, nearly four years before Pearl
Harbor, updated the next year, and modified throughout the war.3
Under the guidance of President Franklin D. Roosevelt the
government redirected some factory output prior to World War II. In
addition, lend-lease agreements enabled the United States to support
Allied efforts to thwart Axis powers while preparing for the nation’s
possible involvement.4 In 1942, the War Production Board was
established to take control of and manage the requirements process. By
1944, the Victory Program had produced 185,000 planes and 120,000
tanks.5 Despite a slow start, the proactive measures that national leaders
began in 1939 laid the groundwork for industry structure and for raw
materials to be postured correctly before war was declared in December
1941. In sum, the nation took three years to produce the equipment
the Army needed for combat operations in a two-front war. Without
Roosevelt’s foresight, an additional two years, or more, might have been
needed to produce the same amount of equipment.
Notably, today’s Army already has lethal units with mostly
modernized equipment and a robust funding and acquisition system.
Unfortunately, the manufacturing base for large equipment is small, and
the competition with foreign companies is great. Today’s systems and
the tools to produce them are more complex, which requires more time
and skill than has been needed previously.
The Army is also challenged by an industry preference for funding
new technology but then producing only enough for deployable units to
use. In practice, this approach creates a small number of well-equipped
units and a large number of ill-equipped units. From the industry
point of view, producing a small amount of equipment for ten years is
preferable to producing a large amount of equipment for three years.6
Thus, to fight a major war, the Army’s leadership must communicate a
sense of urgency to industry leaders about how much and how soon the
equipment is needed.

2      Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States
Army, 1775–1945 (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1955), 479–80.
3       1938 Protective Mobilization Plan; 1939 Protective Mobilization Plan; and Kreidberg and
Henry, Military Mobilization, 479–82.
4       US Office of the Historian, “Lend-Lease and Military Aid to the Allies in the Early
Years of World War II,” US Department of State, October 12, 2017, https://history.state.gov
/milestones/1937-1945/lend-lease.
5      Mobilization, 16–18.
6      Interview with resourcing division chief, January 25, 2017. For operational security purposes,
names and other interview details have been removed.
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The new plan that the Defense Department develops, therefore,
should articulate the intent to mine or to purchase raw materials such as
aluminum, copper, steel, tungsten, and other rare-earth materials.7 Since
the United States is the world’s fourth largest producer of copper and
steel as well as the sixth largest producer of aluminum, acquiring these
resources should be manageable. Although the United States does not
mine or produce tungsten, it could likely purchase that material from
Canada, the world’s third largest producer.8
China produces most rare-earth materials. Thus, purchasing those
materials could be problematic during future conflicts. Other nations
are attempting to produce more of these materials, but progress is
slow. The Defense Logistics Agency manages stockpiles and contracts
for strategic minerals distributed to industry. Public law also allows
defense requirements a higher precedence than commercial needs.9 The
Department of Defense only monitors rare-earth materials, however,
and has no plan to direct the acquisition of raw materials, internally
or from foreign nations, nor to coordinate material distribution to
American industry.10
Albeit with some equipment shortages, the full support of the
government, and unlimited funding, the Army would be able to build
quickly Stryker and light BCTs, field artillery, engineer, transportation,
and other support units. However, as further analysis demonstrates,
numerous challenges exist that prevent theater ballistic air defense units,
combat aviation brigades, and armored BCTs from being doubled as
quickly as other units.

Air Defense Units

Industry could not double the quantity of missile units within three
years. To expand from 15 to 30 Patriot battalions, the Army would need
360 more MIM-104 launchers.11 Current production for this weapon is
designated for foreign military sales, and the M903 launching station
upgrades, scheduled through 2024, do not include producing new units.
Due to the manufacturing time for subcomponents, one battalion could
be fielded within five years.12 A 30-month start-up would be required to
add facility space and vendors.13 Even after prioritizing US needs over
foreign military sales, the program manager would need a minimum of
ten years to equip 15 more Patriot battalions.14
7       Interview with deputy maneuver division chief, December 6, 2016; interview with mission
command system synchronization officer, January 26, 2017; and email message to author,
March 29, 2017.
  8      Amber Pariona, “Top Copper Producing Countries in the World,” World Atlas, April 25, 2017,
http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/top-copper-producing-countries-in-the-world.html; Benjamin
Elisha Sawe, “Top 10 Steel Producing Countries in the World,” World Atlas, April 25, 2017, http://
www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-top-10-steel-producing-countries-in-the-world.html; E. Lee Bray,
“Aluminum,” in US Department of the Interior, Mineral Commodity Summaries, January 2015, (Reston,
VA: US Geological Survey, 2015); and “Tungsten: World Concentrate Production, By Country,”
IndexMundi, March 30, 2017, http://www.indexmundi.com/en/commodities/minerals/tungsten
/tungsten_t15.html.
9      Email message to the author, March 29, 2017.
10       Ronald W. Murawski, Strategic Materials Protection Board Meeting Pre-Brief (Washington DC:
Army, Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology [ASA (ALT)], February 10, 2014), briefing slides.
11      Interview with Patriot system synchronization officer, December 6, 2016.
12      Interview with Patriot deputy system synchronization officer, March 7, 2017.
13      Interview with Patriot deputy system synchronization officer, March 29, 2017.
14      Interview with Patriot system synchronization officer, December 6, 2016.
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Patriot missiles would be even more difficult to double. To obtain
the 3,000 additional missiles, the Army would immediately have to start
stockpiling the missiles required to prosecute any anticipated major war
immediately. The vendor would need 18 months to produce the first
10 missiles before being able to sustain production of 10 missiles per
month, with a surge capability of 30 missiles per month for one year.15
At this rate, the vendor would need about ten years to meet the required
expansion quantity of Patriots. The Army could hire another vendor,
but development and testing of the new missile would require about
five years.16 If the testing was successful, the secondary vendor could
decrease the missile time line to eight years.
An Army plan to double terminal high altitude area defense
(THAAD) missile batteries from 8 to 16 would also fall critically
short within three years. Equipment production for these batteries is
scheduled to end near the end of 2018. If a pending foreign military sale
reopens the production line, the Army’s purchase of this equipment will
be more affordable. Once reopened, the first battery would take three
years to produce. Sustained manufacturing would then produce one to
two batteries per year.17 At this rate, the Army would have 16 batteries
in about seven years.
Ammunition production is more difficult. The combat load of
a THAAD battery is 48 missiles. At current rates of production, the
Army plans to acquire 60 percent of the missiles required for seven
batteries by 2017.18 Fourteen batteries could therefore be fielded, trained,
and deployed by the end of 2021. Obviously, this goal could be met
more quickly with additional vendors developing and producing other
munitions with the same capabilities.
Given the increased demand for short-range air defense capability
during 2017, the Army is reassessing how much additional capacity is
required.19 As a planning factor, the Force Management Directorate
supports one such battalion per division, a growth from 9 to 36
battalions.20 These units could be built with new technology, under
the best of circumstances, within four years. The Army also plans to
place the FIM 92 Stinger short-range, man-portable, air-defense weapon
system in BCTs by the end of 2017 for the first time since 2004 and add
Avengers to Army prepositioned stock.

Combat Aviation Brigades

American industry would be challenged to build the aircraft
necessary to double the existing 21 combat aviation brigades. These
combat units require 137 aircraft each, a total of more than 2,800
aircraft. Additional aircraft would be needed for the generating force
training at Fort Rucker, Alabama. The organizational plan increases
the attack capability by adding Apaches, while decreasing the assault
15      Interview with Patriot system synchronization officer, December 7, 2016.
16      Interview with Patriot system synchronization officer, March 20, 2017.
17      Interview with THAAD system synchronization officer, January 27, 2017.
18      Interview with THAAD system synchronization officer, December 6, 2016.
19       Interview with Joint theater air and missile defense system synchronization officer,
March 8, 2017.
20      Interview with deputy division chief, December 6, 2016.
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and medical evacuation capability by subtracting UH-60 Black Hawk
helicopters, consistent with the vision from Army leadership.21
My number one need is for combat aviation. . . .the biggest gap in our
capabilities. . . . Everybody knows that the Army is designed to fight with
our aviation. So, the Army is trying to figure out a way to do it whether it is
rotational aviation, [or] rotational troops. . . . Combat aviation is critical.22

Building Army aviation is extremely time consuming. For each
airframe, the vendor needs 12 to 18 months to reach maximum
production capacity, to corner the market, and to procure steel and
titanium. Even more challenging is the need to hire and train skilled
laborers to manufacture the complex gearboxes, engines, and drivetrain
components. Opening additional production lines would not help in
the short term, and building a new facility or retooling an existing
facility would take at least 24 to 36 months. New locations would
gradually reach maximum production capacity in four years under the
best circumstances.23
The Army currently has 734 Apache attack helicopter airframes
for an expansion requirement of 42 combat action brigades and for the
training base at Fort Rucker. The airframes would take a minimum of
nine years to produce at a rate of 110 aircraft per year with a start-up
requirement of three years.24 Maximum capacity would occur during the
fifth year, and the rate cannot be increased due to the physical constraints
of the production line. The limitations associated with subcomponent
suppliers, such as the alloys for the compound blade and the time
required to test tolerances and specifications, could be accelerated with
unlimited funding, but not significantly.25 At this rate, 672 aircraft could
be produced in eight years. With two additional facilities, production
could reach maximum capacity in five years, 330 aircraft could be
produced during the seventh year, and the required aircraft would be
available in nine years.26
The quantity of Black Hawk assault helicopters would be extremely
difficult to double within three years, but could be achieved in six. The
Army currently has enough Black Hawks for every expeditionary combat
aviation brigade capable of assault and for those capable of attack and
assault. To increase to 42 combat action brigades and meet the increased
training requirements, the Army will require an additional 700 aircraft.27
The current production pace of UH-60Ms to replace the existing
Black Hawk models should be sustainable through 2028.28 The 30-year
life cycle of the older UH-60As cannot be extended since the deteriorating
airframes are unsafe. The facility could build enough Black Hawks in
36 months to equip four combat aviation brigades. With unlimited
21      Steven Powell, Leader Book, Army 2023 (Washington, DC: HQDA G-3/5/7, December 6,
2016), briefing slides, 50–51.
22      Jen Judson, “Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges: US Army Europe and Its Role in Deterrence,” Defense
News, March 7, 2016.
23      Interview with ASA (ALT) staff, February 16, 2017.
24      Interview with attack aviation system synchronization officer, December 7, 2016.
25      Interview with aviation systems coordinator, March 29, 2017.
26      Interview with ASA (ALT) staff, March 10, 2017.
27      Powell, 50–51.
28      Interview with assault aviation system synchronization officer, December 7, 2016.
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funding, two more facilities could be built to reach the required aircraft
goal during the sixth year.29
The quantity of CH-47 Chinook heavy-lift cargo helicopters for 42
combat action brigades plus the aircraft needed for training requirements
could be met within five years. The Army currently has two production
lines capable of producing 200 aircraft in just over four years.30
Unmanned aerial systems, such as Gray Eagle and Shadow, provide
commanders with battlefield reconnaissance. But, building enough for
42 combat aviation brigades cannot be done within three years. The
program manager for Gray Eagles is still fielding the system to the
Army. If required today, the vendor would need eight years to reach
the additional 300 systems required for expansion. If prioritized, the
Army could receive expansion quantity for Gray Eagle within six
years.31 Similarly, the Army would not have enough Shadow systems
within three years. The Shadow project fielded 416 systems to the
Army before production stopped in 2010. An Army expansion already
underway would increase the required number of Shadows to nearly
1,000 systems. Assuming a 24 month start-up, the vendor could produce
enough Shadows within five years.32

Armored Brigade Combat Teams

Due to the variety of armored vehicles, armored BCTs are the
third most difficult matériel requirement to address for an expansion.
Fortunately, the Army has 15 manned and 5 unmanned sets of equipment
available. Nine manned armored BCTs are in the active component; five
are in the Army National Guard and one rotational set is in Korea. The
Army possesses enough equipment for three armored BCTs in Army
prepositioned stocks. Other sets of equipment are under production.
Thus, to expand from 15 to 30 armored BCTs, 10 additional sets of
equipment will be needed.33 Alternatively, the Army could issue less upto-date equipment from depots.
Army Matériel Command owns older equipment that could be
refurbished and fielded faster than new equipment could be produced.
Most of the excess equipment stored at the depots would support
maneuver and fires brigades as well as combat service support units.
Such equipment could support two armored BCTs of Bradley infantry
fighting vehicles and M113 armored personnel carriers; three battalions
each of M270 multiple launch rocket systems, M142 high mobility
artillery rocket systems, and M119 105mm howitzers; six battalions of
Avenger missile systems; and most of the medium- and heavy-cargo
and fuel trucks to support those organizations.34 Depending on the
personnel and training time lines, the older equipment could expand the
training base or undergo modernization. Moreover, if such equipment
is fielded to the first expansion units, it could be replaced at a later date.
29      Interview with ASA (ALT) staff, February 16, 2017, and March 10, 2017.
30      Interview with heavy lift system synchronization officer, January 11, 2017; and interview with
ASA (ALT) staff, February 16, 2017.
31      Interview with unmanned aerial systems coordinator, March 7, 2017.
32      Ibid.
33      Interview with force development staff, December 7, 2016, and January 10, 2017.
34      Interview with Army Matériel Command liaison, March 29, 2017.
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The most critical pieces of equipment for armored BCTs are
Bradleys and M1 Abrams tanks. Other necessary armored vehicles
include the M109 Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) 155 mm
self-propelled howitzer, the M88 Hercules recovery vehicle, and the
M1 assault breacher vehicle. The BCTs will also have the new armored
multi-purpose vehicles, which replace the aged M113 armored personnel
carrier and share the same chassis as the Bradley. Therefore, expanding
the Army by 10 armored BCTs will require building 870 tanks and 2,670
Bradley chassis.35
The shared chassis poses a challenge. Raw materials for aluminum
plate armor and other key components as well as available facility space
constrain production to no more than 2 armored BCTs per year with
an 18-month lead time. If additional facilities are used, enough chassis
could be produced within six years.36 Alternately, the Bradleys could
be built and fielded before transitioning production to the armored
multi-purpose vehicles. In both scenarios, the Army must coordinate
aluminum procurement with the Defense Logistics Agency. Under
these conditions, the Army could achieve expansion requirements
within 48 months.
The Army can successfully double its tank battalions by modernizing
current inventory. Nearly 2,000 M1A1 Abrams tank hulls can be
refurbished before engines, transmissions, and turrets are added. After
12–18 months, this pipeline can produce enough tanks per month, to
enable the Army to meet tank requirements within 30–36 months.
The upgraded Paladins would require four years to expand from 15
to 30 battalions in the active component and from 10 to 20 battalions
in Guard echelons above the brigade level. Current production of the
modernized howitzer systems can be expanded to meet requirements37
The desired quantity of Hercules systems can be obtained within
24 months by refurbishing current inventory.38 Notably, by ceasing
conversions of A1s to A2s, space can be freed to accommodate the
increased demand for the other armored vehicles.39 Expanding armored
breaching vehicles would take seven years, even though the current rate
of production will field enough vehicles for each armored BCT by 2022.40

Stryker Brigade Combat Teams

Stryker platform production could, with new facilities, be expanded
to equip the force with sufficient vehicles in four years. This rate of
production is enough to fill five of the nine expansion Stryker BCTs
within the 36-month goal. Although expanding Stryker facilities could
increase the rate of production, which would require a 24-month startup time just to complement Stryker vehicle production, the expansion
goal would still take 48 months to achieve.41
35      Interview with deputy maneuver division chief, December 6, 2016.
36      Interview with Program Executive Office Special Project staff, January 26, 2016.
37      Interview with cannon system synchronization officer, December 6, 2016, and March 7, 2017.
38       Interview with integration action officer, February 28, 2017; and interviews with cannon
system synchronization officer, December 7, 2016, and February 28, 2017.
39      Interview with Special Project Office staff, February 28, 2017.
40      Interview with Mobility Branch chief, March 7, 2017.
41      Interview with action officer, February 28, 2017.
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Field Artillery Units

As part of the field artillery expansion, the M270 multiple launch
rocket system (MLRS), the most lethal field artillery system, would
increase sufficiently in three years with no new production.42 Army
Matériel Command has three available battalions of equipment, so the
expansion requirement would be five battalions. The production line for
this equipment was closed in 2005, but older versions of the module can
be modernized.43 The Army can procure the lighter high mobility rocket
system (HIMARS) within four years. HIMARS battalions would expand
from 17 to 34 and require 272 more systems. Using one battalion’s worth
of unmanned systems in prepositioned stock and several owned by Army
Matériel Command, the vendor can produce and field enough of these
rocket systems in the next four years to fill the expansion requirements.
The cannon expansion of M777 155mm howitzers and M119s
will take three years.44 The quantity of M777s would grow from 7 to
14 battalions in echelons above the division level and increase by 32
batteries within the Stryker and infantry BCTs. Production of these
weapons, at a rate of 16 per month, ended in 2011; new production of
M777s requires a two-year start-up.45 M119s would expand from 64 to
128 batteries within infantry BCTs, but some of the 105mm howitzers
are in prepositioned stock and Army Matériel Command owns more of
these weapons as part of a conversion project. Assuming an 18-month
start-up, M119s could reach the expansion target.46
The Army’s new field artillery radar, the AN/TPQ-53 Quick
Reaction Capable Radar, will take four years to field. The vendor is
currently distributing 2 Q53 radars per BCT to replace the older Q36
and Q37 radar systems. Increasing by 172 more radar systems would
take a total of seven years. The Army could mitigate the shortage of
counterfire systems by retaining some of the older systems. With no
funding constraints, the manufacturer could also more than double
the production rate within 18 months of a decision to expand.47 The
AN/TPQ-50 lightweight counter mortar radar could increase by the
required 314 systems in five years.48 The Army could decrease this time
line if it reduced the number of systems for each BCT from 4 to 2.
With unlimited funding, the vendor could also increase production to
16 systems per month.49

Engineer Units

Requirements for bridging equipment, which the Army is currently
short of, and earth moving equipment could be met respectively within
five and two years. Unlimited funding could increase Joint Assault Bridge
output to meet the fielding schedule to armored units by 2022 and restart
production of the Rapidly Emplaced Bridging System production to
field two bridging assets for the expanded maneuver brigades within five
42      Interview with rocket system synchronization officer, December 6, 2016, and March 6, 2017.
43      Interview with rocket systems synchronization officer, January 26, 2017.
44       Interview with rocket systems synchronization officer, December 6, 2016, and January 25, 2017.
45      Interview with rocket systems synchronization officer, January 25, 2017.
46      Interview with rocket systems synchronization officer, December 6, 2016.
47      Interview with product manager, January 26, 2017.
48      Interview with radar system synchronization officer, December 6, 2016.
49      Interview with product manager, January 26, 2017
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years.50 The Army can purchase earth moving equipment quickly from
commercial vendors, who can produce enough bulldozers, excavators,
and other horizontal construction equipment requirements within two
years.51 Additionally, increasing route clearance platoons to protect
maneuver forces could be completed within four years. After depleting
equipment in Army prepositioned stocks, new vendors, with an 18–24
month start-up, could deliver the required quantities of Buffaloes,
Huskys, and Medium Mine Protected Vehicles.52

Supporting Equipment

Communications Equipment. The challenge of communications
equipment—such as radios, mission command systems, and the Joint
Battle Command Platform—occurs not from production, which should
be complete within 36 months, but integrated fielding of this equipment
with the platforms described above. In fact, given enough funding,
industry would be able to produce radios faster than the Army could train
Soldiers.53 Expanding units while maintaining similar communications
equipment and modernization levels, however, would be a struggle.
This aspect would force prioritized fielding to deploying units, causing
combatant commanders to lower communications standards, as well as
focus expansion on maintaining minimal compatibility without latency
throughout the force. As mission command systems are computer
based, the required technologies, such as laptops and software, are easily
procurable in expansion quantities.54
Although the vehicle mounting hardware for the Joint Battle
Command-Platform requires extensive time to install on combat
vehicles and aircraft, expansion could follow the Blue Force Tracking
model—the Army would synchronize procurement with unit
deployment. Requirements might be adjusted by limiting systems to key
unit leaders such as platoon leaders. In this scenario, no two deploying
units would look alike or have the same density. Moreover, 2017 plan
revisions decrease quantity of platforms by 25,000 to improve fielding
velocity and decrease training time by 24 hours to allow reserve units
to train soldiers during one weekend drill.55 The Army would try to
maintain modernization levels within deployment windows to avoid
interoperability challenges. Modernization is anticipated to take eight
years for the existing BCTs, but the Army could decrease this schedule
to three years by synchronizing unit availability with resources.56
Transportation Equipment. The final large, high-density equipment for
the Army are trucks and trailers. Light (80,000), medium (50,000), and
heavy (10,000) trucks, with cargo and fuel capability would take about
five years to complete with a production rate of 20,000 trucks per year
after an 18-month start-up period.57 This time line could be shortened
by allowing more commercial trucks, similar to Mine Resistant Ambush
50      Interview with Mobility Branch chief, March 7, 2017.
51      Interview with mobility support system synchronization officer, March 7, 2017.
52      Interview with protection system synchronization officer, January 25, 2017.
53      Interview with radio system synchronization officer, March 8, 2017.
54      Interview with mission command system synchronization officer, January 26, 2017.
55      Interview with mission command system synchronization officer, March 8, 2017.
56      Interview with mission command system synchronization officer, January 26, 2017.
57      Interview with Transportation Branch chief, March 20, 2017.
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Protected vehicles, or changing American industry to a wartime posture
such as World War II. Either of these options would decrease the
production schedule to three years.

Conclusion

For the Army to respond quickly to a great-power threat, leaders must
complete the critical tasks of approving the organizational and matériel
plans far in advance. World War II experience clearly demonstrates the
benefits of early plans to expand the Army and its required equipment.
American industry produced vast amounts of equipment in the 30
months between Pearl Harbor and the amphibious assault at Normandy.
A detailed organizational plan for expanding deployable units would
influence a detailed matériel plan that could be used to coordinate with
American industry.
Such a collaborative effort will provide vendors with time to
develop their own plans for equipment production as well as allow the
Army to identify the raw materials, space, manpower, and energy needed
for mass production. Synchronization with other organizational plans
such as personnel, training, facilities, sustainment, and ammunition not
discussed here could also occur. Estimates and plans for organization
and matériel should then be updated based upon the evolving adversarial
threats, industry capabilities, and other influences, even during expansion.
Assuming unlimited funding and some optimistic circumstances,
equipment projections for tanks, howitzers, and other major equipment
are favorable; however, shortages in theater ballistic defense, aviation,
and armored units are anticipated. Steps to mitigate these deficiencies
include adding vendors who can develop and produce other versions of
theater ballistic defense weapons and attack aviation aircraft, leveraging
Army prepositioned stock, incorporating older equipment on-hand,
and purchasing new commercial equipment. In order to mitigate major
transportation equipment shortages, Army leadership could change the
organizational plan by decreasing units or equipment quantities as well
as deploy units into battle with shortages.

